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PRISONER DENIED SEX REASSIGNMENT 
SURGERY: THE FIRST CIRCUIT IGNORES 
MEDICAL CONSENSUS IN  
KOSILEK v. SPENCER 
Abstract: On December 16, 2014, in Kosilek v. Spencer, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit held that refusing to provide a transgender prisoner sex 
reassignment surgery did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The court reasoned 
that the prisoner’s claim did not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation be-
cause she received adequate treatment for gender dysphoria and prison officials 
were not deliberately indifferent to her medical needs. This Comment argues that 
the First Circuit erred by ignoring medical consensus and relying on an outlier 
medical opinion when determining that sex reassignment surgery was not consti-
tutionally required. Further, the majority’s decision will have the unforeseen con-
sequence of preventing other prisoners in the First Circuit from successfully 
bringing an Eighth Amendment claim for sex reassignment surgery in the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, Michelle Kosilek strangled her wife to death after her wife 
caught Kosilek wearing her clothes.1 Kosilek is anatomically male, self-
identifies as a female, and suffers from gender dysphoria.2 Kosilek was sen-
tenced to life without parole for first-degree murder in 1992, and that same 
year she sued the Massachusetts Department of Correction (“DOC”) for violat-
ing her Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care for gender dyspho-
ria.3 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek IV), 774 F.3d 63, 68–69 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
2059 (2015) (mem.). Kosilek met her wife at a drug rehabilitation facility and before they married, her 
wife told Kosilek that a “good woman” could cure her gender dysphoria. See Kosilek v. Maloney 
(Kosilek I), 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 164 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 2 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 68. An individual is diagnosed with gender dysphoria, formerly 
known as gender identity disorder, when they identify with the gender opposite to that given to them 
at birth and experience clinically significant distress as a result of their desire to be the other gender. 
See Gender Dysphoria, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., http://www.dsm5.org/documents/gender%20
dysphoria%20fact%20sheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/EK3Y-G5SC]. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manu-
al of Mental Disorders (“DSM-V”) diagnoses these individuals with gender dysphoria, and replaces 
the old name, “gender identity disorder,” in order to “better characterize the experiences of affected 
children, adolescents, and adults.” Id. Although previous litigation referred to gender identity disorder, 
this Comment uses gender dysphoria. See id. 
 3 See Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 159. In 2002, the district court found that the Massachusetts 
Department of Correction (“DOC”) was not violating Kosilek’s Eighth Amendment right because 
Kosilek did not prove that the DOC was aware that failing to provide her with certain treatments 
“might result in serious harm.” See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 69. Nevertheless, the court required the 
18 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:17 E. Supp. 
In 2012, in Kosilek v. Spencer (“Kosilek II”), the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts held that Kosilek suffers from severe gender dys-
phoria and that sex reassignment surgery offers the only adequate medical care 
pursuant to the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.4 
On December 16, 2014, in Kosilek v. Spencer (“Kosilek IV”), the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit, sitting en banc, held that although Kosilek suffers 
from gender dysphoria, refusing to provide sex reassignment surgery did not 
violate Kosilek’s Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care.5 
This Comment argues that the First Circuit, sitting en banc, erred by ig-
noring the World Professional Association for Transgender Health Standards of 
Care (“WPATH Standards of Care”) that recommended sex reassignment sur-
gery for Kosilek.6 Part I of this Comment discusses a prisoner’s right to ade-
quate medical care and the role of consensus in the medical community when 
determining what constitutes adequate medical care.7 Part I also reviews the 
factual and procedural history of Kosilek IV.8 Part II examines the Kosilek IV 
en banc court’s holding and Judge Thompson’s dissent.9 Part III argues that the 
Kosilek IV court’s decision departs from the generally accepted practice of de-
ferring to medical consensus when determining a prisoner’s Eighth Amend-
ment right to adequate medical care.10 Part III concludes that the majority’s 
decision could have the unforeseen consequence of preventing other prisoners 
                                                                                                                           
DOC to implement a treatment regime moving forward. See id. The DOC began providing Kosilek 
with hormone therapy, but she sued the DOC again after being denied sex reassignment surgery. See 
id. at 69–70. 
 4 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), 889 
F. Supp. 2d 190, 250 (D. Mass. 2012), rev’d en banc, 774 F.3d 63, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059. The 
district court was affirmed on appeal, but it was reheard and reversed en banc. See Kosilek IV, 774 
F.3d at 68; Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek III), 740 F.3d 733, 736 (1st Cir. 2014), withdrawn, 774 F.3d 
63 (en banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059. 
 5 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 96 (holding that Kosilek’s current treatment regime was constitu-
tionally adequate). 
 6 See infra notes 83–93 and accompanying text. The World Professional Association for 
Transgender Health is an international professional association devoted to transgender health and 
publishes the Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender-
Nonconforming People (“WPATH Standards of Care”). See Brief for the World Prof’l Ass’n for 
Transgender Health as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Kosilek, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (No. 14-
1120) [hereinafter WPATH Brief]. Professionals in the United States use the WPATH Standards of 
Care to treat individuals with gender dysphoria. See Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 197. Depending on 
the individual, medically necessary treatment may involve a combination of psychotherapy, hormone 
treatment, and sex reassignment surgery. See id. 
 7 See infra notes 16–36 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 37–54 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 55–82 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 83–93 and accompanying text. 
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in the First Circuit from successfully bringing an Eighth Amendment claim for 
sex reassignment surgery in the future.11 
I. ADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE: RELYING ON MEDICAL CONSENSUS TO 
PROTECT PRISONERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
Although prisoners have lost their liberty while incarcerated for past 
crimes, they are still entitled to certain rights, including adequate medical care.12 
Section A discusses a prisoner’s right to adequate medical care under the Eighth 
Amendment.13 Section B reviews how courts have relied on medical consensus 
when weighing scientific and medical evidence in Eighth Amendment cases.14 
Section C reviews the facts and procedural posture of Kosilek IV.15 
A. Prisoners’ Eighth Amendment Right to Adequate Medical Care 
The Eighth Amendment guarantees prisoners humane treatment, includ-
ing the right to adequate medical care.16 Because prisoners are dependent on 
the government for their medical needs while incarcerated, the government’s 
failure to provide adequate medical care could constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment amounting to an Eighth Amendment violation.17 To prove an 
Eighth Amendment violation based on the denial of adequate medical care, a 
prisoner must demonstrate (1) an objectively serious medical need, and (2) that 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 12 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–03 (1976) (stating that the Eighth Amendment’s guid-
ing principle of human dignity obligates the government to provide medical care for prisoners); see 
also Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 194 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Eighth amendment protections are not 
forfeited by one’s prior acts.”). The Eighth Amendment also obligates prison officials to provide ade-
quate food, clothing, shelter, and safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). 
 13 See infra notes 16–28 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 29–36 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 37–54 and accompanying text. 
 16 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (establishing that a prisoner cannot be subjected to “cruel and 
unusual punishments”); Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (noting that prisoners do not 
forfeit human dignity as a result of being incarcerated and that respecting this dignity is central to the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 
(noting that prison officials must provide humane conditions because to do otherwise would inflict 
cruel and unusual punishment on prisoners); Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 204 (stating that it is un-
derstandable that murderers, like Kosilek, are unsympathetic candidates for humane treatment, but 
that it is this same reasoning that necessitates Eighth Amendment protections and its enforcement by 
courts). 
 17 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1928 (denying medical care could lead to suffering or death, and is 
therefore “incompatible with the concept of human dignity”); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (stat-
ing that Eighth Amendment protection does not guarantee comfortable prisons, but rather humane 
conditions which include adequate medical care). 
20 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:17 E. Supp. 
prison officials were subjectively aware of and deliberately indifferent to that 
need.18 
An objectively serious medical need can be mental or physical and exists 
when inadequate medical care results in a substantial risk of serious harm to a 
prisoner.19 Additionally, it is one that is diagnosed by a doctor as requiring 
treatment or is so obvious that a layperson would assume treatment is neces-
sary.20 The medical community and courts recognize gender dysphoria as a 
serious medical need.21 When a prisoner has a serious medical need, the Eighth 
Amendment establishes an affirmative duty upon prison officials to provide 
medical care that is adequate.22 Adequate medical care does not mean the most 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (defining “deliberate indifference” as a prison official’s subjective 
awareness of the risk to a prisoner’s health and safety); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“[A] prisoner must 
allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical 
needs. It is only such indifference that can offend evolving standards of decency in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.”); Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 82 (acknowledging the two requirements). Over the 
past decade, transgender prisoners suffering from varying degrees of gender dysphoria have success-
fully gained access to medical care under the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 
550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that a state statute prohibiting hormone therapy and sex reassign-
ment surgery for prisoners violated the Eighth Amendment because it constituted deliberate indiffer-
ence to a prisoner’s serious medical need); Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1195 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015) (granting a prisoner with gender dysphoria a preliminary injunction for sex reassignment 
surgery); Phillips v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 731 F. Supp. 792, 800–01 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (ordering 
prison officials to reinstate hormone therapy for a transgender prisoner), aff’d, 932 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 
1991). 
 19 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (stating that a prisoner must show “conditions posing a substantial 
risk of serious harm” to prove an objectively serious medical need); Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 
231, 234 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that the Eighth Amendment protects both physical and mental health 
needs); Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 207. 
 20 See Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that a 
prisoner who appeared bruised with visible abrasions did not present a serious medical need); Mon-
mouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (“The serious-
ness of an inmate’s medical need may also be determined by reference to the effect of denying the 
particular treatment.”). 
 21 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 86 (acknowledging that gender dysphoria is a serious medical con-
dition that requires treatment); Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1195 (recognizing a prisoner’s gender 
dysphoria as requiring adequate medical care, including sex reassignment surgery); Fields v. Smith, 
712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 862 (E.D. Wis. 2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 550 (acknowledging that gender dysphoria 
constitutes a serious medical need); FAQ on Access to Transition-Related Care, LAMBDA LEGAL, 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/transgender/transition-related-care-faq [http://perma.cc/
D9SS-YJEZ] (noting that the DSM-V recognizes gender dysphoria as a medical diagnosis, and that 
the American Medical Association recognizes gender dysphoria as a serious medical condition). 
 22 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (holding that prison officials have an Eighth Amendment duty to “en-
sure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care”); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 
(establishing that the government has an obligation “to provide medical care for those whom it is 
punishing by incarceration”); Joel H. Thompson, Today’s Deliberate Indifference: Providing Atten-
tion Without Providing Treatment to Prisoners with Serious Medical Needs, 45 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. 
REV. 635, 638 (2010) (noting that the Eighth Amendment provides prisoners the right to adequate 
medical care for their serious medical needs). 
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sophisticated care or care of a prisoner’s choosing.23 Rather, adequate care 
must meet prudent professional standards.24 
Once a prisoner demonstrates a serious medical need, an Eighth Amend-
ment claim is only viable if prison officials are subjectively aware of and de-
liberately indifferent to that need.25 Prison officials are deliberately indifferent 
if they purposefully fail to treat the medical need by denying, delaying, or in-
terfering with prescribed care.26 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s need is 
balanced against security concerns.27 If denying a prisoner certain medical 
treatment is made in good faith and is based on a reasonable safety concern, 
the denial may not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.28 
B. Courts Refer to and Rely on Professional Consensus When  
Determining the Validity of Medical Testimony 
Courts routinely refer to and rely on a consensus of experts when weigh-
ing scientific and medical evidence in their decision-making.29 In the Eighth 
Amendment context, the U.S. Supreme Court has relied on experts, whose 
opinions were grounded in professional consensus, because to do otherwise 
                                                                                                                           
 23 United States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 42–43 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 24 Id. at 43 (stating that medical care must be “at a level reasonably commensurate with modern 
medical science and of a quality within prudent professional standards”). 
 25 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828–29 (holding that deliberate indifference requires proof that prison 
officials are “subjectively aware” of  “a substantial risk of serious harm” to a prisoner). Prison offi-
cials must be aware of this risk through inference, and they must actually draw the inference. Id. at 
837. 
 26 See Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 453 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining that subjective intent does 
not require deliberate intent to harm); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05 (noting that deliberate 
indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical need can be “manifested by prison doctors in their re-
sponse to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to med-
ical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed”). 
 27 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 83 (recognizing that security considerations inherent in operating a 
prison must be considered when evaluating whether prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a 
prisoner’s needs); Tammi S. Etheridge, Safety v. Surgery: Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Housing 
of Transgender Inmates, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 585, 595 (2014) (arguing that judges afford defer-
ence to how prison officials decide to maintain security so long as decisions are made for legitimate 
purposes and in good faith). 
 28 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 83 (stating that denying care may not violate the Eighth Amend-
ment if decisions are based on legitimate prisoner safety and security concerns); Battista, 645 F.3d at 
454 (noting that decisions made in good faith would excuse a prison official from being found delib-
erately indifferent); Etheridge, supra note 27, at 595 (observing that prison officials successfully argue 
that sex reassignment surgery should not be provided because a post-operative prisoner would face a 
heightened risk of assault and lack of safe housing options). 
 29 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993) (noting that Rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence restricts expert testimony to scientific knowledge, and describing “scien-
tific knowledge” as a theory or technique grounded in professional consensus such as peer review and 
publication); see also Rebecca Haw, Delay and Its Benefits for Judicial Rulemaking Under Scientific 
Uncertainty, 55 B.C. L. REV. 331, 367 (2014) (highlighting the type of expert testimony allowed after 
the Daubert decision). 
22 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:17 E. Supp. 
could result in an individual being subjected to cruel and unusual punish-
ment.30 For example, in 2002, in Atkins v. Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court 
concluded that executing intellectually disabled persons violated the Eighth 
Amendment based on a professional consensus among mental health experts 
that intellectually disabled people often act on impulse and thus are less men-
tally culpable than those without intellectual disabilities.31 Similarly, in 2005 in 
Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that executing juveniles violated the Eighth 
Amendment, relying on a consensus in scientific and sociological studies that 
demonstrated how juveniles lack maturity, act on impulse, are susceptible to 
negative influences, and lack character development when compared to 
adults.32 
In an Eighth Amendment claim for adequate medical care specifically, a 
judge’s decision to give credibility to peer-supported medical evidence is criti-
cal because a misstep could result in a court condoning cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.33 In order to ensure that prisoners receive adequate care, medical rec-
ommendations must be of a quality acceptable within prudent professional 
standards.34 Where a consensus exists, outlier medical opinions may still meet 
the prudent professional standard if they demonstrate a credible basis for ig-
                                                                                                                           
 30 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317–
18 (2002). 
 31 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317–18 (relying on established research and citing “clinical definitions 
of mental retardation” as defined by the American Association on Mental Retardation and the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association); see also Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993 (2014) (noting that Flori-
da’s IQ threshold for death penalty eligibility was unconstitutional because it did not accurately meas-
ure intellectual disability, and thereby could lead to an intellectually disabled person’s execution in 
violation of Atkins). Similar to the Court’s reliance on professional consensus in Atkins, the Court in 
Hall v. Florida relied on medical consensus when determining how to measure intellectual disability 
rather than Florida’s rule that ignored “established medical practice.” See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1993–94; 
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 67 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[A]n inmate challenging a method of 
execution should point to a well-established scientific consensus.”). 
 32 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 82 (2010) (refer-
ring to similar scientific and sociological studies as Roper and holding both that juveniles are less 
culpable and that a life without parole sentence for a juvenile offender who did not commit a homicide 
is unconstitutional). See generally Sarah French Russell, Jury Sentencing and Juveniles: Eighth 
Amendment Limits and Sixth Amendment Rights, 56 B.C. L. REV. 553, 560–61 (2015) (discussing the 
categorical limits the Eighth Amendment places on sentencing juveniles and attributing these limits to 
developmental differences between juveniles and adults). 
 33 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 90 (explaining that choosing a treatment plan “commensurate with 
the medical standards of prudent professionals . . . is a decision that does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment”); WPATH Brief, supra note 6, at 5 (advocating the importance of referring to profes-
sional consensus because it provides an objective and reliable authority to weigh competing views); 
Esinam Agbemenu, Medical Transgressions in America’s Prisons: Defending Transgender Prisoners’ 
Access to Transition-Related Care, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 18 (2015) (arguing that courts 
should rely on the consensus of the medical community when determining whether transgender pris-
oners have a serious medical need requiring adequate medical care). 
 34 See DeCologero, 821 F.2d at 42–43 (stating that medical care must be “at a level reasonably 
commensurate with modern medical science and of a quality within prudent professional standards,” 
and need not be the most sophisticated or of a prisoner’s choosing). 
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noring the consensus.35 Nevertheless, if a doctor’s outlier medical opinion in 
an Eighth Amendment case departs significantly from peer consensus, the doc-
tor’s treatment recommendations may be found imprudent and constitutionally 
inadequate.36 
C. District Court Holds That Sex Reassignment Surgery  
Is Constitutionally Required 
Michelle Kosilek was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole 
for killing her wife in 1992, and sued the DOC that same year for violating her 
Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care.37 In 2002, in Kosilek v. 
Maloney (“Kosilek I”), the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
recognized that she had a serious medical need, and in 2003 the DOC began 
providing her with hormonal treatment, female clothing, electrolysis, and con-
tinued mental health treatment.38 Dr. David Seil, the gender identity specialist 
who prescribed this treatment, also suggested that Kosilek be considered for 
sex reassignment surgery after a year of hormone therapy.39 His recommenda-
tion was consistent with the WPATH Standards of Care, which recommends 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 650 (1998) (“A health care professional who disagrees 
with the prevailing medical consensus may refute it by citing a credible scientific basis for deviating 
from the accepted norm.”); Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 90 (holding that when there are two courses of 
treatment that meet prudent professional standards, prison officials can follow either treatment plan 
for a prisoner). 
 36 See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that a treatment decision that 
is “so far afield of accepted professional standards” could lead to an Eighth Amendment violation); 
see also Allard v. Baldwin, 779 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2015) (“[I]n cases where some medical care is 
provided, a plaintiff ‘is entitled to prove his case by establishing [the] course of treatment, or lack 
thereof, so deviated from professional standards that it amounted to deliberate indifference.’” (quoting 
Smith v. Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90, 93 (8th Cir.1990))); Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 
2014) (stating that “a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or stand-
ards” could amount to constitutionally inadequate medical care); Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 
332 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that to prove an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner “must show that 
the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances”). 
 37 See Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 159 (noting that Kosilek was not receiving adequate treatment 
for gender dysphoria until she brought suit). 
 38 Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 69–70 (noting that the DOC provided a number of treatments for 
Kosilek’s serious medical need except for sex reassignment surgery); Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 
184. 
 39 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 218 (noting that Dr. Seil recommended a future assessment of 
Kosilek by a gender specialist to determine whether sex reassignment surgery would be required as a 
final step to treat Kosilek); see WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF 
CARE FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER-NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 
54–55 (7th ed. 2012) [hereinafter WPATH STANDARDS OF CARE] (recognizing that sex reassignment 
surgery is recommended only for those for whom “relief from gender dysphoria cannot be achieved 
without modification of their primary and/or secondary sex characteristics to establish greater congru-
ence with their gender identity”). 
24 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:17 E. Supp. 
sex reassignment surgery for a small fraction of patients with severe gender 
dysphoria.40 
In 2004, the DOC consulted Fenway Community Health Center about 
treatment for Kosilek.41 Dr. Kevin Kapila and Dr. Randi Kaufman of Fenway 
Community Health Center evaluated Kosilek and recommended sex reassign-
ment surgery as the only adequate treatment.42 The DOC then retained Cynthia 
Osborne, a gender identity specialist, and Dr. Chester Schmidt, a psychiatrist, 
to review Dr. Kapila and Dr. Kaufman’s recommendation.43 Ms. Osborne and 
Dr. Schmidt disagreed with the recommendation of sex reassignment surgery, 
concluded that the surgery was not medically necessary, and emphasized that 
the WPATH Standards of Care were merely guidelines.44 Finally, the DOC is-
sued a report focused on the security and housing concerns that would arise if 
Kosilek were given the surgery.45 When the DOC subsequently denied sex re-
assignment surgery, Kosilek requested an injunction ordering the DOC to pro-
vide her with the surgery.46 
On September 4, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts held in Kosilek II that Kosilek suffered from severe gender dysphoria 
and that sex reassignment surgery offered the only adequate medical treatment 
pursuant to the Eighth Amendment.47 The Kosilek II court found that Dr. 
Schmidt’s recommendation against the surgery did not meet prudent profes-
                                                                                                                           
 40 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 218. The WPATH Standards of Care establishes a triadic treat-
ment sequence, requiring an individual to first go through hormone therapy and have a real-life expe-
rience of living as a member of the opposite sex before having sex reassignment surgery. See WPATH 
STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 39, at 60. 
 41 Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 70–71. 
 42 Id. Although Dr. Kapila and Dr. Kaufman found that Kosilek was responding positively to 
hormone treatment, electrolysis, female clothing, and mental health care, they recognized that Kosilek 
was still distressed by her male genitalia and that it was likely that she would attempt suicide again if 
not provided with the surgery. See id. at 71. Kosilek attempted suicide twice and self-castration once 
while awaiting trial for murdering her wife. See id. at 69. The University of Massachusetts Correc-
tional Health Program (“UMass CHP”), the DOC’s health services provider, reviewed and affirmed 
Fenway Community Health Center’s recommendation. See id. at 71. Dr. Kapila, Dr. Kaufman, and a 
clinician at UMass CHP testified at trial that sex reassignment surgery was medically necessary and 
the only adequate treatment to ameliorate Kosilek’s severe gender dysphoria. See Kosilek II, 889 
F. Supp. 2d at 233. 
 43 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 71, 76–77. 
 44 See id. at 76–77 (highlighting Dr. Schmidt’s view that the WPATH Standards of Care are not 
authoritative because a number of gender dysphoria specialists disagree with them and recommend 
alternative treatment plans). Instead, Dr. Schmidt recommended antidepressants and psychotherapy to 
manage Kosilek’s distress and potential suicide state upon denial of the surgery. See Kosilek II, 889 F. 
Supp. 2d. at 233.  
 45 Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 74. The report suggested that post-surgery, Kosilek would be targeted 
for assault if she remained at MCI-Norfolk, an all-male prison, and she would cause mental distress to 
female prisoners if transferred to an all-female prison. See id. 
 46 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 196. 
 47 Id. at 250–51 (issuing an injunction requiring the DOC to provide Kosilek with sex reassign-
ment surgery). 
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sional standards because his recommendation departed from the WPATH 
Standards of Care and was based on a categorical approach opposing the sur-
gery altogether.48 The court reasoned that, when balanced against security con-
cerns, the denial of sex reassignment surgery was not made in good faith and 
was not based on reasonable safety concerns.49 The Kosilek II court also de-
termined that security concerns were a pretext for avoiding public and political 
backlash.50 
In 2014, in Kosilek v. Spencer (“Kosilek III”), a panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the Kosilek II court’s decision to grant 
Kosilek sex reassignment surgery.51 The Kosilek III panel held that the Kosilek 
II court did not clearly err in finding that sex reassignment surgery was re-
quired because Kosilek’s current treatment of receiving hormones, female 
clothing, electrolysis, and mental health care was constitutionally inadequate.52 
The Kosilek III panel also held that the Kosilek II court did not clearly err in 
rejecting the DOC’s safety concerns and concluding that DOC officials were 
deliberately indifferent to Kosilek’s medical needs.53  
                                                                                                                           
 48 See id. at 235–36. Dr. Schmidt also believed that Kosilek could not meet the second part of the 
WPATH Standards of Care treatment sequence because Kosilek did not have real-life experience 
living as a female. See id. at 235. In response, Dr. Kapila and Dr. Kaufman argued that the purpose of 
the real-life experience requirement was to ensure that a person knew what to expect in a different 
gender role. See id. They believed Kosilek fulfilled this requirement by living as a woman in an all-
male prison. See id. 
 49 See id. at 238–47. Although one of the security concerns for housing Kosilek at an all-male 
prison was that she would be targeted for assault, Kosilek had not been assaulted for many years, even 
while dressed as a female, wearing make-up, and having long hair. See id. at 243–44. The DOC also 
feared that housing Kosilek at an all-female prison would cause mental trauma to women prisoners 
who have suffered domestic violence. See Kosilek III, 740 F.3d at 745. There was, however, conflict-
ing testimony as to whether Kosilek would actually disrupt the climate of the prison. See Kosilek II, 
889 F. Supp. 2d at 244. 
 50 See Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 247. The Deputy Commissioner of the DOC at the time of 
Kosilek’s first suit served under a Lieutenant Governor and State Senator who expressed opposition to 
the surgery. See id. at 246. When a new Deputy Commissioner was hired, Senators and State Repre-
sentatives wrote to him opposing public funds going toward a prisoner’s sex reassignment surgery. 
See id. 
 51 Kosilek III, 740 F.3d at 772–73 (holding that the trial judge did not clearly err when finding 
that Kosilek had a serious medical need requiring surgery and that the DOC was deliberately indiffer-
ent to that need); see also id. at 761 (noting that on appeal, findings of fact are reviewed only for clear 
error). 
 52 See id. at 766 (holding that the district court’s decision was supported by ample evidence in-
cluding “three eminently qualified doctors [who] testified without objection, in accord with widely 
accepted, published standards”). 
 53 See id. at 768–71 (agreeing with the district court’s finding that safety concerns “followed 
hasty, results-driven evaluations,” and deferring to the lower court’s finding that public disapproval 
played a role in denying the surgery). 
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After the Kosilek III panel upheld the Kosilek II court’s decision to grant 
an injunction requiring the DOC to provide Kosilek with sex reassignment 
surgery, the decision was granted en banc review.54 
II. THE FIRST CIRCUIT’S DECISION TO DENY SEX REASSIGNMENT  
SURGERY AND JUDGE THOMPSON’S DISSENT 
On December 16, 2014, in Kosilek v. Spencer (“Kosilek IV”), the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the First Circuit 
panel’s decision in Kosilek v. Spencer (“Kosilek III”).55 The Kosilek IV en banc 
court held in a 3–2 decision that Kosilek did not meet the two requirements 
needed to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation for the denial of ade-
quate medical care.56 The court reasoned that Kosilek did not prove either that 
she received inadequate treatment for her gender dysphoria or that the Massa-
chusetts DOC was deliberately indifferent to her serious medical need.57 Sec-
tion A reviews the majority’s holding.58 Section B discusses Judge Thompson’s 
dissent.59 
A. First Circuit Reverses and Holds That Sex Reassignment Surgery  
Is Not Constitutionally Required 
The majority in Kosilek IV agreed with the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts’s finding in Kosilek v. Spencer (“Kosilek II”) that 
Kosilek’s gender dysphoria is a serious medical need requiring treatment.60 But 
the Kosilek IV en banc court disagreed with the Kosilek II court and the Kosilek 
III panel as to the form of adequate medical care.61 The Kosilek IV majority 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 63. 
 55 Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek IV), 774 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 
(2015) (mem.). 
 56 See id. at 96 (holding that Kosilek’s current regime of care is constitutionally adequate); id. at 
104 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s decision to reverse the Kosilek II court’s find-
ing that Kosilek satisfied the objective and subjective requirements); id. at 114 (Kayatta, J., dissent-
ing) (criticizing the majority for inappropriately taking on the role of a trial court). 
 57 See id. at 96 (majority opinion) (determining that Kosilek’s current treatment of hormones, 
female clothing, electrolysis, and access to mental health treatment was adequate and that the denial of 
treatment was based on reasonable safety concerns). 
 58 See infra notes 60–72 and accompanying text. 
 59 See infra notes 73–82 and accompanying text. 
 60 Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 86 (recognizing that Kosilek has a serious medical need that mandates 
treatment); Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 229 (D. Mass. 2012) (finding that 
Kosilek has a serious medical need and that she is at risk of serious harm without adequate treatment), 
rev’d en banc, 774 F.3d 63, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059. 
 61 Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 90 (holding that sex reassignment surgery is not constitutionally re-
quired). The Kosilek IV court disagreed with the Kosilek II court and Kosilek III panel that both found 
sex reassignment surgery to be the only adequate treatment for Kosilek’s severe gender dysphoria. Id.; 
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held that when there are two courses of treatment that meet prudent profes-
sional standards, either treatment plan is considered adequate.62 The Kosilek IV 
court agreed with experts from the DOC who argued that withholding sex reas-
signment surgery from Kosilek did not breach the DOC’s constitutional duty to 
provide Kosilek with adequate care.63 
The Kosilek IV majority explained that the Kosilek II court made several 
errors by concluding that Dr. Schmidt’s recommendation against surgery was 
imprudent.64 Although Dr. Schmidt’s medical opinion departed from the 
WPATH Standards of Care, the majority noted that the WPATH Standards of 
Care are flexible guidelines rather than requirements.65 Additionally, the 
Kosilek IV en banc court adopted Dr. Schmidt’s recommendation that antide-
pressants and psychotherapy could manage Kosilek’s potentially depressed 
state upon learning she would not receive surgery.66 The en banc court also 
rejected the district court’s finding that Dr. Schmidt was imprudent for con-
cluding prisoners could not have a real-life experience as required by the sec-
ond phase of the WPATH Standards of Care’s triadic treatment sequence.67 
Because the Kosilek IV majority held that the current treatment regime was 
                                                                                                                           
Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek III), 740 F.3d 733, 736 (1st Cir. 2014), withdrawn, 774 F.3d 63 (en banc), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059; Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 236. 
 62 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 90 (noting that where there are two treatment plans commensurate 
with prudent professional standards, the Massachusetts DOC need not adopt the one seen as more 
compassionate). See generally Ryan Dischinger, Adequate Care for a Serious Medical Need: Kosilek 
v. Spencer Begins the Path Toward Ensuring Inmates Receive Treatment for Gender Dysphoria, 22 
TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 169, 174–75 (2013) (discussing how the First Circuit is guided by the medical 
community when determining the adequacy of care, and noting that the care must be acceptable within 
prudent professional standards). 
 63 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 90 (holding that receiving hormones, female clothing, electrolysis, 
and mental health care met prudent professional standards). 
 64 See id. at 87–89. 
 65 See id. at 87 (reasoning that the WPATH Standards of Care are clinical guidelines and are 
intended to be flexible). But see WPATH STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 39, at 2 (attributing the 
Standards’ flexibility to individualized care). 
 66 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 88. Kosilek argued that denying her surgery would result in a sub-
stantial risk of serious harm to her well-being because her dysphoria would escalate and potentially 
result in another suicide attempt. See id. at 86. When Kosilek was convicted of murder and awaiting 
trial, she attempted suicide twice and self-castration once; however, since incarceration, she has not 
tried to harm herself. See id. at 69. The en banc court noted that Kosilek’s current treatment plan that 
includes hormone therapy has led to feminization, contributing to a stabilized mental state. See id. at 
90. Furthermore, the majority agreed that antidepressants and psychotherapy could mitigate potential 
self-harming behavior. See id. 
 67 See id. at 88. Because Kosilek is imprisoned, Dr. Schmidt believed that Kosilek could not have 
a real-life experience living as a member of the opposite gender because she would not face the daily 
societal stresses of living as a woman. See id. The en banc court stated that the district court made an 
inferential leap that Kosilek could still have a real-life experience in prison. See id. According to the 
WPATH Standards of Care, the rationale for a real-life experience is so that patients will socially 
adjust to their desired gender roles before an irreversible surgery. See WPATH STANDARDS OF CARE, 
supra note 39, at 60–61. 
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adequate, Kosilek failed to meet the first requirement of her Eighth Amend-
ment claim.68 
Even if Kosilek could have proven that sex reassignment surgery was 
medically necessary, the Kosilek IV majority held that she would still not have 
an Eighth Amendment claim because she did not prove that prison officials 
were subjectively aware of and deliberately indifferent to her needs.69 The 
DOC argued that they could not have purposefully failed to treat Kosilek’s 
gender dysphoria because experts provided two treatment plans that were both 
medically adequate.70 The Kosilek IV majority also rejected the district court’s 
finding that security concerns were a pretext for avoiding public and political 
backlash, and instead held that the DOC’s security concerns were reasonable.71 
Finally, the majority agreed with the DOC’s argument that it was important to 
discourage a belief that threats of suicide would result in prisoner demands 
being granted.72 
B. Judge Thompson’s Dissent: Majority’s Decision Supports an Imprudent 
Medical Opinion and Unreasonable Safety Concerns 
Judge Thompson argued in dissent in Kosilek IV that ample evidence sup-
ported the Kosilek II court’s decision that Dr. Schmidt was imprudent in his 
recommendation against sex reassignment surgery.73 Like the Kosilek II court, 
the dissent rejected Dr. Schmidt’s opinion that Kosilek could not have a real-
                                                                                                                           
 68 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 90–91 (holding that Kosilek did not prove that the denial of sex 
reassignment surgery was constitutionally inadequate). 
 69 See id. at 91–92. 
 70 See id. (“The choice of a medical option that, although disfavored by some in the field, is pre-
sented by competent professionals does not exhibit a level of inattention or callousness to a prisoner’s 
needs rising to a constitutional violation.”). 
 71 See id. at 93–94. The Kosilek IV majority focused on the security concerns around housing a 
post-operative male-to-female transsexual in an all-male prison or an all-female prison. See id. at 93. 
The DOC argued that because the security concerns were reasonable, the denial of care did not 
amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. See id. The Kosilek IV court held that the record did not 
support the Kosilek II court’s conclusion that security concerns were a pretext for public and political 
criticism. See id. at 94–96. Although the Deputy Commissioner of the DOC at the time of Kosilek’s 
first suit served under a Lieutenant Governor and State Senator who expressed opposition to the sur-
gery, the Commissioner consistently testified that denying the surgery was based on security concerns. 
See id. at 94. Unlike the Kosilek II court, the Kosilek IV court did not reject this testimony, and noted 
that even if the Commissioner was motivated by security and non-security concerns, it would not 
make the DOC’s security concerns completely pretextual. See id. The Kosilek IV court also rejected 
the Kosilek II court’s finding that the Commissioner’s views influenced future Commissioners. See id. 
at 95. 
 72 See id. at 94. The DOC feared that providing Kosilek with the surgery would cause an in-
creased demand from prisoners for benefits to mitigate suicidal ideations. See id. 
 73 See id. at 104 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (arguing that Dr. Schmidt’s departure from the 
WPATH Standards of Care and the medical evidence supports the Kosilek II court’s finding that his 
treatment plan was imprudent). 
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life experience as a female because she is in prison.74 The dissent also discred-
ited Dr. Schmidt’s recommendation of antidepressants and psychotherapy if 
Kosilek were to become suicidal.75 The dissent noted that Dr. Schmidt’s rec-
ommendation against surgery departed from the WPATH Standards of Care, 
the authoritative standard for treating patients with gender dysphoria.76 Alt-
hough the majority held that the WPATH Standards of Care provide flexible 
guidelines rather than requirements, the dissent attributed the flexibility to in-
dividualized care rather than flexibility in applying the Standards altogether.77 
Unlike the Kosilek IV majority, the dissent concluded that the DOC’s op-
position to surgery was based on unreasonable safety concerns.78 The dissent 
agreed with the Kosilek II court’s finding that the DOC’s security report did 
not provide enough evidence to prove Kosilek’s surgery would result in rea-
sonable security risks.79 Judge Thompson further argued that ample evidence 
proved that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to Kosilek’s serious 
medical need.80 The dissent rejected the notion that conflicting medical opin-
ions automatically shield the DOC from being deliberately indifferent.81 In-
                                                                                                                           
 74 See id. at 103 (agreeing with the Kosilek II court that found Dr. Schmidt imprudent because 
ample evidence supported the fact that a person could have a real-life experience in prison). Judge 
Thompson agreed with the Kosilek II court and noted that given that the purpose for requiring a real-
life experience is for someone to socially adjust to his or her new gender role, Kosilek met this pur-
pose by identifying herself as a woman in an all-male prison. See id. 
 75 See id. at 104. Judge Thompson noted that rather than treating Kosilek’s underlying illness, 
antidepressants and psychotherapy treated the illness’s symptoms. See id. at 106. 
 76 See id. at 102. 
 77 See id. Departure from the WPATH Standards of Care may be attributed to a patient’s individ-
ualized situation or to the evolution and development of the gender dysphoria field. See WPATH 
STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 39, at 2. The dissent argued that Dr. Schmidt’s departure from the 
WPATH Standards of Care was based on a categorical approach opposing sex reassignment surgery 
altogether. See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 103 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
 78 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 109, 113 (Thompson, J., dissenting). Judge Thompson noted that 
after each doctor recommended sex reassignment surgery for Kosilek, the Commissioners delayed the 
surgery by finding another specialist to review Kosilek’s treatment plan. See id. at 109. Furthermore, 
the dissent explained that the security report presented by the DOC was “rushed and results-driven.” 
See id. at 110. The dissent highlighted how the DOC met to discuss security concerns a week before a 
report was due in court, that the DOC’s attorneys mostly wrote the report, and that at trial the DOC’s 
security experts were not prepared. See id. 
 79 See id. at 110 (criticizing the majority for supporting a security report that took a “throw-it-up-
and-see-what-sticks approach”); see also Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 243 (finding the DOC’s secu-
rity concerns as pretext for not providing Kosilek with the surgery). 
 80 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 113 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (stating that prison officials were 
deliberately indifferent by delaying recommended medical treatment, seeking out a medical opinion 
favorable to the DOC, presenting a rushed and results-driven security report, providing unsubstantiat-
ed security concerns, and denying surgery out of fear of political and public backlash). 
 81 See id. at 107–08. The dissent noted that based on that reasoning, the DOC could avoid provid-
ing medically necessary treatment if it could find an expert with a differing opinion. See id. at 108; see 
also United States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that treatment decisions are 
not left unchecked and that they must meet prudent professional standards). 
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stead, the dissent argued that sex reassignment surgery was supported by the 
majority of experts, the WPATH Standards of Care, and by Kosilek herself.82 
III. IGNORING MEDICAL CONSENSUS AND RELYING ON AN OUTLIER 
MEDICAL OPINION SHOULD AMOUNT TO AN EIGHTH  
AMENDMENT VIOLATION 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s 2014 en banc decision in 
Kosilek v. Spencer (“Kosilek IV”) is problematic because it ignored a medical 
consensus on adequate medical care, thereby departing from established U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.83 The Kosilek 
IV en banc court relied on an outlier medical opinion, and thus condoned an 
Eighth Amendment violation by the Massachusetts DOC.84 If a medical ex-
pert’s opinion departs significantly from professional standards, as was the 
case in Kosilek IV, his or her treatment recommendation should be found im-
prudent and constitutionally inadequate.85 The outlier medical opinion in 
Kosilek IV not only contradicted the WPATH Standards of Care, but also the 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 106 (Thompson, J., dissenting). For example, after Kosilek’s first 
suit in 2002, Dr. Seil, a gender identity specialist, recommended sex reassignment surgery following a 
year of hormonal treatment. Id. at 70 (majority opinion). In 2004, the two Fenway Community Health 
Center doctors, Dr. Kapila and Dr. Kaufman, also recommended the surgery. Id. at 71. Their recom-
mendations were also reviewed and accepted by the DOC’s health-service provider, University of 
Massachusetts Correctional Health Program. Id.; see also The Supreme Court, 2013 Term—Leading 
Cases, 128 HARV. L. REV. 271, 273 (2014) (noting that when courts determine who qualifies as intel-
lectually disabled and how they should be treated “the medical community’s opinions” are consulted). 
See generally Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1995 (2014) (striking down Florida’s IQ threshold for 
death penalty eligibility because the IQ test disregarded “established medical practice”). 
 83 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (relying on a consensus in “scientific and 
sociological studies”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317–18 (2002) (relying on established re-
search and citing “clinical definitions of mental retardation” as defined by the American Association 
on Mental Retardation and the American Psychiatric Association); Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek IV), 
774 F.3d 63, 102 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015) (mem.) (Thompson, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that a number of courts have relied on the WPATH Standards of Care). 
 84 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 104 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the Kosilek II court’s 
finding that the outlier medical opinion provided by Dr. Schmidt did not meet prudent professional 
standards). In 2012, in Kosilek v. Spencer (“Kosilek II”), the district court relied on the WPATH 
Standards of Care to ensure the prudence of expert opinions arguing that sex reassignment surgery 
was medically necessary for treating gender dysphoria. See Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), 889 
F. Supp. 2d 190, 231 (D. Mass. 2012) (“[T]he Standards of Care continue to describe the quality of 
care acceptable to prudent professionals who treat individuals suffering from gender identity disor-
ders.”), rev’d en banc, 774 F.3d 63, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059. The Kosilek II court criticized Dr. 
Schmidt’s treatment plan as imprudent. See id. at 236. 
 85 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 90 (majority opinion) (explaining that choosing a treatment plan 
“commensurate with the medical standards of prudent professionals . . . is a decision that does not 
violate the Eighth Amendment”). But see Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting 
that a treatment decision that is “so far afield of accepted professional standards” could amount to an 
Eighth Amendment violation). 
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majority of experts in Kosilek IV and other cases that have relied on the Stand-
ards.86 
Nothing other than following the WPATH Standards of Care qualifies as 
adequate medical care for treating patients with gender dysphoria.87 Accord-
ingly, the Kosilek IV court should have relied on the WPATH Standards of Care 
and reaffirmed the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts’s 2012 
decision in Kosilek v. Spencer (“Kosilek II”) that found sex reassignment sur-
gery as the only adequate treatment for Kosilek.88 Courts routinely give defer-
ence to consensus in the medical community over outlier opinions.89 For ex-
ample, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, in 2002, re-
ferred to a consensus of medical experts to determine that executing intellectu-
                                                                                                                           
 86 See Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek III), 740 F.3d 733, 764 (1st Cir. 2014), withdrawn, 774 F.3d 
63 (en banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059; O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 134 T.C. 
34, 70 (2010) (relying on the WPATH Standards of Care, the U.S. Tax Court held in 2010 that sex 
reassignment surgery for those suffering from severe gender dysphoria is medically necessary and is 
not a cosmetic procedure). Dr. Schmidt was also the outlier medical opinion in O’Donnabhain v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and in 2010 the United States Tax Court rejected his approach as 
“idiosyncratic and unduly restrictive.” See O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 75. 
 87 See De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 522–23 (4th Cir. 2013) (describing the WPATH Stand-
ards of Care as “generally accepted protocols” for treating gender dysphoria); Norsworthy v. Beard, 
87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (noting that the WPATH Standards of Care “are recog-
nized as authoritative standards of care by the American Medical Association, the American Psychiat-
ric Association, and the American Psychological Association”); Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 
228, 231 (D. Mass. 2012) (highlighting that the WPATH Standards of Care are “generally followed in 
the community”). Relying on the WPATH Standards of Care, the Tax Court in O’Donnabhain held 
that sex reassignment surgery for those suffering from severe gender dysphoria is medically necessary 
and is not a cosmetic procedure. See O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 70; see also Agbemenu, supra note 
33, at 8 (stating that the WPATH Standards of Care are “the preeminent authority on treatment of 
those suffering with gender dysphoria”). The organization that publishes the WPATH Standards of 
Care includes “more than 600 physicians, psychologists, social scientists, and legal professionals 
dedicated to the treatment of gender identity disorders.” WPATH Brief, supra note 6, at 1. 
 88 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 102 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (highlighting a number of courts 
that have relied on the WPATH Standards of Care); Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (finding sex 
reassignment surgery the only adequate treatment). 
 89 See Arnett, 658 F.3d at 751 (noting that a treatment decision that is “so far afield of accepted 
professional standards” could lead to an Eighth Amendment violation); see also Allard v. Baldwin, 
779 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2015) (“[I]n cases where some medical care is provided, a plaintiff ‘is 
entitled to prove his case by establishing [the] course of treatment, or lack thereof, so deviated from 
professional standards that it amounted to deliberate indifference.’” (quoting Smith v. Jenkins, 919 
F.2d 90, 93 (8th Cir.1990))); Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating that “a 
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards” could amount to 
constitutionally inadequate medical care); Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(noting that to prove an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner “must show that the course of treat-
ment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances”); Agbemenu, supra note 
33, at 18 (advocating that courts should rely on the consensus of the medical community when deter-
mining whether transgender prisoners have a serious medical need requiring adequate medical care); 
WPATH Brief, supra note 6, at 5 (“[P]rofessional consensus provides an objective anchor for the 
court’s decisions and a reliable benchmark against which factfinders can judge the merits of compet-
ing views.”). 
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ally disabled persons was cruel and unusual.90 Similarly, the Court in Roper v. 
Simmons, in 2005, deferred to professional consensus to ensure the scientific 
validity of expert opinions arguing that juveniles should be treated differently 
than adults.91 Furthermore, in 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California granted a prisoner with gender dysphoria a preliminary 
injunction for sex reassignment surgery, relying on the WPATH Standards of 
Care to weigh and reject an outlier medical opinion.92 Consistent with these 
cases, the Kosilek II court also relied on the WPATH Standards of Care to en-
sure the prudence of expert opinions arguing that sex reassignment surgery 
was the only adequate treatment for Kosilek.93 
Granting deference to an outlier medical opinion forecloses all future ar-
guments transgender prisoners in the First Circuit could make that denying sex 
reassignment surgery constitutes inadequate medical care in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.94 The Kosilek IV majority disagreed that their decision 
would create a “de facto ban” against the surgery because this and future deci-
sions are individualized.95 Given the majority’s decision to allow prison offi-
cials to choose between treatment plans, however, it is difficult to imagine a 
prisoner who could successfully bring an Eighth Amendment claim for sur-
gery.96 In a future case, the DOC could simply find an expert opposed to the 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 (relying on established research and citing “clinical definitions of 
mental retardation” as defined by the American Association on Mental Retardation and the American 
Psychiatric Association). 
 91 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70 (relying on a consensus in “scientific and sociological studies”). 
 92 See Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1188 (rejecting the expert opposing the surgery because he 
“misrepresent[ed]” the WPATH Standards of Care, made “illogical inferences,” and “generaliz[ed]” 
the experience of prisoners with gender dysphoria). Prison officials appealed the decision in Norswor-
thy v. Beard, but prior to oral arguments the prisoner was paroled, so the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. See 802 F.3d 1090, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2015). Since Nors-
worthy, and as a result of another transgender prisoner case that was settled, California has adopted a 
policy to provide sex reassignment surgery for some prisoners. See Richard Pérez-Peña, California Is 
First State to Adopt Sex Reassignment Surgery Policy for Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2015, at 
A15. 
 93 See Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 250; Agbemenu, supra note 33, at 18 (arguing that “courts 
should . . . rely heavily on well-established knowledge of the medical community” when determining 
whether transgender prisoners have a serious medical need requiring adequate medical care). 
 94 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 106–07 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s 
decision “creates a de facto ban on sex reassignment surgery for inmates in this circuit”); id. at 115 
(Kayatta, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for “lock[ing] in an answer that binds all trial courts 
in the circuit: no prison may be required to provide [sex reassignment surgery] to a prisoner who suf-
fers from gender dysphoria as long as a prison official calls up Ms. Osborne or Dr. Schmidt.”). 
 95 See id. at 90–91 (majority opinion); see also Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 859 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(noting that prison officials cannot have blanket policies for prisoners with medical needs, and must 
instead make individualized assessments). 
 96 See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 106–07 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (“[I]f Kosilek—who was time 
and again diagnosed as suffering from severe gender identity disorder, and who was uniformly 
thought by qualified medical professionals to require surgery—is not an appropriate candidate for 
surgery, what inmate is?”). 
2016] First Circuit Denies Sex Reassignment Surgery to Transgender Prisoner 33 
surgery, because in following the majority’s opinion, prison officials can 
choose among treatment plans regardless of a plan’s support throughout the 
medical community.97 
CONCLUSION 
In Kosilek v. Spencer, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, sit-
ting en banc, ignored the WPATH Standards of Care, which prescribe the ap-
propriate course of treatment for gender dysphoria. Instead of relying on the 
WPATH Standards of Care, which were strongly supported by expert testimo-
ny backed by medical consensus as well as other courts, the First Circuit ac-
cepted an outlier medical opinion when deciding what constituted adequate 
medical care for Kosilek. The decision may lead to Kosilek being subjected to 
cruel and unusual punishment, and it could have the unforeseen consequence 
of preventing any prisoner suffering from severe gender dysphoria in the First 
Circuit from successfully bringing an Eighth Amendment claim for sex reas-
signment surgery in the future. 
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